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Judicial Elections: Recent Developments, Historical Perspective, and Continued Viability
Laura Zaccari
In the United States today the vast majority of states conduct elections in some form or
fashion to select members of the judiciary.' These elections bring into conflict two ideals of
American government: officials who are accountable to the people, and the idea of a fair and
impartial judiciary. Organizations such as the American Bar Association and the American
Judicature Society have expressed misgivings about judicial elections for years; however,
judicial elections continue to have support from voters.2 Judicial elections raise a myriad of
ethical and political questions that have been the source of heated debate for years; however,
several recent state and federal court decisions may have brought the debate to a head.
Addressing issues such as the Voting Rights Act, 3 and the First Amendment issues of campaign
spending limits and restrictions on campaign speech, the courts have taken the position that
competitive judicial elections are subject to the same laws as all other elections. This line of
cases recently
culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
5
White.
In the wake of recent decisions, and given the current state of politics in general, judicial
elections appear to be at a crossroads. Historical justifications for judicial elections no longer
seem to match the political realities faced by judicial candidates. An examination of this
apparent dichotomy necessarily begins with the history behind the rise of the elected judiciary
and why so many states found this a preferable method of judicial selection. Beyond the history,
however, is a recent body of law and the body politick, both of which seem to indicate that
judicial elections may be an idea past their prime. This thesis examines both the historical
justifications and the modem context in which judicial elections occur, ultimately concluding
that the delicate balance of judicial independence and direct democracy is threatened by recent
developments.
I. A Brief History of Judicial Elections in the United States
In order to understand the history of judicial elections, one must first examine the
philosophies supporting an appointed judiciary versus those supporting an elected judiciary. On
the Federal level, judges are appointed for life; the most often cited support for this method of
judicial selection comes from the Federalist Number 78, in which Alexander Hamilton justifies
life tenure for judges by writing:
[T]hat as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have
every thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments.. .and that
as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence, as
1 See Larry

C. Berkson, JudicialSelection in the UnitedStates: A SpecialReport, 64 JUDICATURE 176 (1980),

available at www.ajs.org/js/berkson.pdf (last visited Mar. 7 2004).
2 See Terry Carter, Boosting the Bench, 88 A.B.A.J. 28, Oct. 2002.
3 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (2000).
4 U.S. CONST.

amend. I.

'Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an
indispensable ingredient in its constitution.....
The Framers considered life tenure a necessary measure to protect judges from political
pressures. 7 In contrast, judges on the local level needed to be responsive to their communities,
and early in our history the states began to provide for election of judges. 8 Whereas the Framers
were concerned with issues of judicial independence, state legislatures were concerned with
issues of public trust, and believed
that an elected judiciary would be more respected within the
9
community that elected them.
Our early history as a nation follows very much in the pattern of our history as a colony
of England. In colonial times, the King appointed judges.' 0 The appointment of the judiciary
was thoroughly debated during the ratification of the Constitution, ultimately resulting in life
tenure for the federal judiciary. Most states followed suit,11 appointing their judges either by the
executive or by the legislature.12 Until 1845, every state that entered the union did so with a state
constitution that provided for appointed judges, but from 1845 until the early 1900s the opposite
was true--every state admitted provided for judicial elections.' 3 With the rise of Jacksonian
Democracy, people began to attack the appointed judiciary as a bastion of the upper class, and
many states instituted systems whereby judges would be elected.' 4 New York changed its
constitution to allow for elected judges in 1846, and 15by the time of the Civil War, twenty-four
(24) of thirty-four (34) states had an elected judiciary.
With the rise of the elected judiciary, however, came the ills of elective politics, and it
seemed that the people had traded one set of problems for another. Political machines often
selected judges, and their qualifications were often called into question. 16 Voters often had a low
level of knowledge or interest. 17 Even in the late nineteenth century, issues of campaign funding,18
and campaign content were eroding the legitimate arguments in favor of an elected judiciary.
Legislators often recognized the problems and limits of judicial elections during this time, but it
was not until the American Bar Association rose to prominence in the early part of the twentieth
century, that states began to reexamine their judiciaries. 19 Such judicial luminaries as Learned
6 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
7 STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION 31 (A.B.A.
8

Standing Committee on Judicial Independence ed., 2000).

1d

9 See id.
10See Berkson,

supra note 1, at 176.
11 In 1788, Virginia provided for judges to be elected by the General Assembly. While terms of office have

changed, this has been the judicial selection method in the Commonwealth ever since. The only exception was a
twenty-year period from 1850-1870 when judges were popularly elected. History of the Supreme Court of Virginia,
at http://www.courts.state.va.us/scov/cover.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
12 See Berkson, supranote 1, at 176.
13 Polly

J. Price, Selection ofState Court Judges, in STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE JUDGES 9,

13 (Roger Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996).
14 Berkson,

supra note 1, at 176.
supra note 1, at 176.
16 Berkson, supra note 1, at 176-77.
15 Berkson,

17 STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION,
18 STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION,

19

See Price, supra note 13, at 14.

supra note 7, at 31.
supra note 7, at 31.
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Hand, William Howard Taft, and Roscoe Pound attacked the politicization of the judiciary.20 It
was not until the 1940s that states began to implement alternatives to appointment or election of
judges. 21 In 1940, Missouri became the first state to adopt a commission plan whereby judges
are appointed and face retention elections. 22 Today, the fundamental tensions still remain-an
appointed judiciary may be contrary to democratic principles, whereas an elected judiciary
appears to compromise its impartiality in the political process.
II. Why an Elected Judiciary?
The premise that judicial elections are at a turning point is predicated on the idea that at
one time this method of selecting judges did have some utility. While many of the justifications
to be discussed are historical remnants, they are nonetheless useful, and often still pertinent to
the current state of affairs.
As mentioned in Part I, infra, the single most important factor in the introduction of
judicial elections on the state level was the rise of Jacksonian Democracy. 23 Within this broad
umbrella are many factors that continue to shape our view of all elective politics, not just judicial
elections. One cornerstone in the rise in popularity of an elected judiciary was the notion that if
the people elected judges, those people would have greater trust of the judges and decisions
would command more respect. 24 This notion is central to the general role of democratic
government, in which officials are accountable to their constituents, by way of representation
and participation. 25 Additionally, an elected judiciary would be more independent than an
appointed one because issues of patronage would not be a factor. 26 Furthermore, elected judges
would exercise a more effective restraint on all government power. 2 7 This issue became
important to Jeffersonians and Jacksonians in the wake of Marbury v. Madison28 because they
felt that that decision reflected a lack of judicial accountability. 29 All of these factors reflect the
delicate balance between30the representative ideals of Jacksonian Democracy and the notion of an
"independent" judiciary.
Beyond the goals of popular sovereignty are several related issues that were often cited
historically and continue to be part of the debate on the efficacy of judicial elections, albeit for
different reasons. As with many popular measures, judicial elections grew in influence because
of notorious (but isolated) instances of misconduct. 3' Voters also perceived the appointed judges

20
21

Price, supra note 13, at 14; see also Berkson, supranote 1, at 177.
See Price, supra note 13, at 15.

22 See Price, supra note 13, at 14.
23 See Price, supra note 13, at 13.

24 STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 7, at 31.
25

See

DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY:

INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY 1 (1995).
26 Price, supra note 13, at 13-14.
27 Price, supra note 13, at 13-14.

1 Cranch 137 (1803).
29 Jay A. Daugherty, The MissouriNon-PartisanCourt Plan: A Dinosauron the Edge ofExtinction or a Survivor in
a ChangingSocio-Legal Environment?, 62 Mo. L. REV. 315-16 (1997).
30 See generally PINELLO, supranote 25, at 1-6.
31 Price, supra note 13, at 13-14.
28
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as part of the landed class and wanted to terminate their exercise of privilege. 32 Hand-in-hand
with a desire to terminate the privileges of the upper class was a desire to select a judiciary that
was more sympathetic to the needs of the "common man" and the previously disenfranchised.33
Modem justifications for an elected judiciary are not so much new ideas, but
reformulations of the original notions that an elected judiciary gets its authority from, and is
responsible to, the people who elect it. One view reflecting this concept is that judicial review
has an inherently political function and that a legislature will not be so quick to intervene in what
it considers to be "poor" decisions if it knows a remedy is available at the ballot box to remove
judges. 34 Similarly, elected judges would reflect the views of the voting majority; therefore
tension between the legislative and judicial branches would be minimized. 35 Courts that have
examined various issues related to judicial elections have also provided modem context to the
36
basic idea that elected judges are part of a democratic ideal. In In re Hon. John M Chmura,
(discussed in detail in Part IV (B), infra) the Michigan Supreme Court explained that judicial
elections continue to be important because "meaningful debate should periodically take place
concerning the 37overall direction of the courts and the role of individual judges in contributing to
that direction."
The history and reasoning behind the rise of judicial elections and their continued
popularity are central to the notion that time has eroded many of these justifications. Modem
political realities intrude on notions of representative democracy on all levels and offices,
including the judiciary. As will be seen, efforts to insulate judicial elections from these modern
political realities have essentially failed, which brings into question many of the original
justifications supporting an elected judiciary.
III. Current Methods of Judicial Selection
While no two states employ exactly the same method by which they select their judiciary,
there are four primary methods for selecting judges, three of which involve some sort of elective
process. In the United States today, 87% of trial and appellate judges face elections-53% of
appellate judges and 77% of trial judges face contested elections. 38 The following overview is
compiled in large part from American Judicature Society "Summary of Initial Judicial Selection
Methods" and is intended to provide a background of the myriad of methods of judicial selection.
A. Merit Selection ("Commission Plans") and Combined Methods
Merit selection systems are the most varied of the selection methods. As a general rule, a
nominating commission will provide a list of qualified candidates to the governor, who then
32 LARRY BERKSON, ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES:

A COMPENDIUM

OF PROVISIONS

3

(American Judicature Society 1980).
33See PINELLO, supra note 25, at 2.
34 STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION,
35See PINELLO, supra note 25, at 3.
36 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000).
37
38

1d. at 42.

supra note 7, at 31.

Roy A. Schotland, FinancingJudicialElections 2000: Change and Challenge,L.

849, 853 (2001).

REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L.
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appoints the judges. 39 At some point early in the judge's tenure, most plans call for nonpartisan
retention elections, with periodic follow-up elections at longer intervals. 40 These plans may be
employed on the appellate level and not at the trial level (as in Kansas), or even vary from
county to county (as in Indiana).4 1 Commission members may be appointed by any number of
methods, including appointments by the governor, legislature, state bar, or any combination
thereof. In Florida, for example, the nine member judicial selection commission consists of three
members appointed by the governor, three members appointed by the Florida Bar Association,
and three members selected by the six already appointed.42 Florida uses the commission plan
and retention elections on the appellate level, and nonpartisan contested elections on the circuit
court level.43 Since Missouri was the first state to use a commission and retention
election plan,
44
Plan."
"Missouri
the
as
known
often
is
method
selection
this type of judicial
B. Partisan Election
Currently nine states employ partisan elections as their primary judicial selection
method.45 Even within this category, there are variations on the theme that may appear more like
retention elections (such as in Illinois) or nonpartisan elections (such as in Louisiana, as the
result of open primaries).46 Additionally, many states conduct partisan elections at the circuit
court level, even if they employ another method on the appellate level.47
C. Nonpartisan Election
48
Twelve states use nonpartisan elections as their primary method of judicial selection.
As the name implies, nonpartisan elections do not list party affiliation on the ballot, but in many
states, the political parties are still active in the nominating process, and are able to campaign on
behalf of "their" candidate.
Thus a technically nonpartisan election assumes the characteristics
49
of a partisan election.

39 See Berkson, supra note 1, at 177-78.
40

AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION

COURTS (2002), available at www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf (last visited Mar. 7 2004). States using
merit selection include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska,
Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming.
41
Id.
42 See Price, supra note 13, at 16.
43 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note
40.

44 Price, supra note 13, at 14.
4'AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 40. These states are Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, North

Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia.
46
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 40.
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 40.
48
47

AMERICAN JUDICATURE

supra note 40. These states are Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.
49
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supranote 40. Michigan and Ohio are the prime examples of this phenomena,
and are therefore considered to conduct partisan elections.
SOCIETY,
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D. Appointment
50
Five states appoint their judiciaries, but even this method yields five different outcomes.
In California, the governor appoints judges to the appellate level who face retention elections
(trial judges are selected by nonpartisan election).51 In Maine and New Jersey, the governor
appoints judges to an initial term, and then may reappoint them with the consent of the state
legislature.52 In Virginia and South Carolina, the state legislatures appoint the judiciary, and
may elect to reappoint members of the judiciary after their initial term. 53 Notably, no state uses
the federal method of judicial selection, although in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, judges
may serve until reaching age seventy once selected by commission,
and in Rhode Island, judges
54
commission.
nominating
by
selected
once
life
may serve for

IV.

The Intersection of Ethics Rules, Campaign Finance, and the
Voting Rights Act in Judicial Elections

While there are numerous issues that impact modem judicial elections, there are three
areas that have been most common in recent litigation surrounding elections and campaigns.
Two of these issues, ethics rules and campaign finance, are actually both sub-issues of First
Amendment jurisprudence. The Voting Rights Act 55 cases are important extensions of the
Fourteenth Amendment body of law. All three of these areas of election law bring into question
some of the cornerstone justifications of an elected judiciary-public trust, community
leadership, class divisions, and impartiality.
A. The Voting Rights Act and Its Impact on Judicial Elections
In Chisom v. Roemer,56 the Supreme Court provided for the first time clear guidance to
the states on whether the provisions of Voting Rights Act extended to judicial elections. In
57
Chisom and its companion case, Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General of Texas,
the Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the use of the word "representative" in Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, the Act intended to include judicial elections. 58 At issue in Chisom was
the composition of state supreme court judicial election districts in Louisiana. One of the
supreme court districts around New Orleans was composed of four parishes: the Orleans parish
comprised about half of the population of the supreme court district, and was approximately 50%
African-American; the other three parishes were about 75% Caucasian. 59 The Supreme Court
did not address whether this composition in fact violated the Voting Rights Act by "diluting]
50

AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,

supra note 40.

51 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,supra note 40.
52 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 40.
52 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,supra note40.

5'AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note

40.

5'42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. (2000).
56 501 U.S. 380 (1991).

57 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
58

See Chisom at 404. Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act reads, in part: "[denial or abridgement based on race or

color] is established if... members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a)... have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (2000)).
59 Chisom at 384-85.
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minority voting strength., 60 Rather, the Court addressed only the issue of whether the Voting
Rights Act applied to judicial elections, and held that it does apply. 6 1 The companion case,
Houston Lawyers' Association, held that the Voting
Rights Act applies to the election of trial
62
facts.
of
set
similar
a
on
based
Texas,
judges in
In both Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Association, the Court was dealing with contested
judicial elections; however, whether the Voting Rights Act applied to retention elections was still
an unresolved issue. In 1997, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri faced this
63
question in African-American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. State of Missouri.
Several voting rights groups challenged the "Missouri Plan" alleging that African-Americans
were under-represented on the bench.6 4 Holding that the Voting Rights Act does apply to
retention elections as well as traditional elections, the district court also held that no remedy
could be fashioned to alleviate the under-representation issue because the concentration of black
voters on opposite sides of the state (for example, in Kansas City and St. Louis) would create a
district that was neither "geographically compact nor contiguous." 65 In reaching its conclusion,
the court made several findings of fact regarding the racial composition of the bench, AfricanAmerican access to retention elections, and the cohesiveness of the African-American vote in
retention elections.6 6
The application of The Voting Rights Act to judicial elections is a fairly recent
development, and its long-term impact on the viability of judicial elections is still unknown. The
Supreme Court's holding in Chisom made it clear that the Voting Rights Act applied to contested
judicial elections, and African-American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund extended the
application of the Voting Rights Act to retention elections. While these cases may seem clearcut, their impact could be far-reaching. With all types of judicial elections now subject to
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, litigation regarding the composition of judicial districts and
years of minority exclusion or under-representation on the bench could now become the source
of litigation. The voluminous findings of fact listed in the district court opinion in AfricanAmerican Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund indicate the types of issues that courts may face
when dealing with Voting Rights Act cases in the future.6 7 While it would seem that contested
elections would be more subject to this type of potential litigation, as the African-American
Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund case indicates, states that conduct retention elections are not
exempt from Section 2 and Voting Rights Act litigation. These factors, and the fact that women
and minorities have historically been under-represented in elective systems 6as
opposed to
8
future.
the
in
issue
this
on
litigation
more
spawn
may
systems,
merit
or
appointive

60
61
62
63
64

1d. at 385.
1d. at 404

Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 421.
994 F.Supp. 1105 (1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 921 (1998).
1d. at

1110.

651d. at

1123.

66

See id. at 1112-18.

67

See id.

68

See PINELLO, supra note 25, at 3.
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The Voting Rights Act and the potential litigation it may cause are not likely to be the
determining factors in whether a state changes its method of selecting the bench. However,
considered in combination with other factors, such as the cost of elections and the detriment they
may have on the reputation of the bench and bar, the impact of the Voting Rights Act cases could
have a significant impact on states contemplating such a change.
B. State Ethics Rules and the First Amendment
States that conduct judicial elections have attempted to regulate candidate conduct during
judicial elections by limiting what candidates can say or how much they can spend in the
campaign. Ohio, Michigan, and Alabama are of particular interest because their attempts to
regulate judicial candidates are well litigated and most clearly reflect the tension between
popular democracy and judicial independence. Each of these three states, all of which conduct
partisan elections, have attempted to regulate judicial candidates. 69 The outcomes in these states,
coupled with most recent Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
could have an impact on how all states conduct their judicial selection, possibly to the point
where states may reevaluate their selection method.
Analysis of campaign finance law necessarily begins with Buckley v. Valeo. 70 In that
landmark case, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act71 that limited both contributions and expenditures that could be
made in the course of a political campaign. 72 The Court held that limits on contributions were
valid as it "is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose-to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual contributions-in order to find a
constitutionally sufficient justification...." 73 In contrast, the Court invalidated restraints on
campaign expenditures: "It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to
restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups and candidates.
The
restrictions.. .limit political
expression
'at
the
core of our electoral process and of the First
74
Amendment freedoms.'
In Suster v. Marshall,the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio addressed the
issue of limits on campaign expenditures in judicial contests. 75 The Ohio Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 7(C)(6) placed a ceiling on how much a candidate for judicial office could spend
during a campaign.76 Judge Suster, who was running for reelection and wanted to spend more
than the $75,000 limit placed on candidates for the court of common pleas, requested a
preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the canon provision. 77 Applying strict scrutiny
to the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, and relying heavily on the logic of Buckley v. Valeo, the
69

AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 40.

70

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441 et seq. (2003).

71
72
73

74

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
Id. at 26.

Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
71951 F.Supp. 693, 695 (N.D.Ohio 1996). (The Court also addressed the issue of use of leftover campaign funds,

however the outcome of that portion of the case is not relevant to the First Amendment issue).
76 Id.at 695.
77

Id. at 696.
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District Court in Suster held that the canon was "not narrowly tailored to achieve the state
interest of ensuring the independence of the judiciary." 78 The court rejected the argument that
"judicial election speech" is different from "legislative election speech" because of the unique
nature of the position of judge. 79 Finding that it was likely that Judge Suster would succeed on
the merits of his constitutional claim, the court granted a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the canon. 80
Along with campaign finance issues, political speech and the extent to which a state may
control that speech, has also been the focus of a great deal of litigation. In just the last two years,
the Supreme Courts of Alabama and Michigan have addressed the issue of whether judicial
81
canons may limit what a candidate for judicial office may say during the course of a campaign.
The canons at issue in both Butler v. Alabama JudicialInquiry Commission82 and In re
Chmura83 were very similar and sought to proscribe candidates for judicial office from making
public communications that the candidates know to be false or misleading. 84 The Michigan
Supreme Court held the canon unconstitutional because "it is not narrowly tailored to serve the
state's compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of the election process and ensuring
public confidence in the judiciary." 85 The court focused on the aspects of the canons that
restricted "core political speech":
We accept the principle that judges are different from legislative and executivebranch officials. By providing for the election of judges, the people of Michigan
have not transformed judges into legislators or executives. They have, however,
adopted a method of judicial selection that takes86 place in the arena in which the
First Amendment affords its broadest protection.
78

1d at 700.
1d at 698-99.
8
0 Id. at 701, 705.
81 Ohio addressed a similar issue in In re Complaint Against Judge Harper, 673 N.E.2d 1253, 1267-68 (1996). The
Ohio court rejected a constitutional challenge to a canon proscribing certain campaign speech. For reasons that will
become apparent in Part IV(C), infra, Ohio's decision is no longer valid.
82 802 So.2d 207, 211 (2001).
83 608 N.W.2d at 33.
84 The judicial canon at issue in Chmura is Michigan Canon of Judicial Conduct 7(B)(1)(d) and it provides,
79

[A] candidate for judicial office should not use or participate in the use of any form of public
communication that the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading, or which is
likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve.
Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 33 n.1. The Canon at issue in Butler is 7B.(2) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial
Ethics which reads:
During the course of any campaign for nomination or election to judicial office, a candidate shall
not, by any means, do any of the following: Post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or
distribute false information concerning a judicial candidate or an opponent, either knowing the
information to be false or with reckless disregard of whether the information is false; or post,
publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute true information that would be deceiving or
misleading to a reasonable person.
Butler, 802 So.2d at 213.
85 Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 38.
86
Id. at 39-40.

Richmond JournalofLaw and the PublicInterest

Summer 2004

The Michigan Court was concerned about the canon's potentially chilling effect on one of the
stated reasons for conducting judicial elections providing a forum for debate regarding the
direction and state of the judiciary. 87 Ultimately, the court invalidated all but
the portion of the
88
false.
be
to
known
is
that
information
of
dissemination
the
prohibiting
canon
The following year, Butler posed a constitutional challenge to Alabama's canons. The
Alabama Supreme Court held that its canon restricting speech during judicial campaigns was
unconstitutional and could only survive if it was narrowly tailored to prohibit knowingly false
statements. 89 The Butler court adopted the Chmura reasoning, adding an important gloss on
political speech in judicial elections:
The people of Alabama have chosen to select their judges in partisan, contested
elections. So long as this is the case, it is essential that judicial candidtates have
'the unfettered opportunity to make their views known,' so that voters may
intelligently evaluate the candidates' positions on issues of vital public
importance. Thus, the political speech ofjudicial candidates in this state must be
guaranteedthe fullest applicationof the FirstAmendment's protections.90
C. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
The jurisprudence discussed above can be summarized as follows: elections are elections,
regardless of what kind of office is at stake. Consequently, the protections of the Voting Rights
Act and First Amendment attach. While this is an admittedly simplistic summary of a complex
area of law, it fairly represents the context in which the Supreme Court decided Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White9 1 in the summer of 2002.
In Chmura and Butler, the issues involved were essentially the same, and the judicial
canons in controversy were virtually identical. In White, the issue is the same-whether the First
Amendment can allow regulation of political speech-but the canon at the heart of the dispute,
the so-called "Announce Clause," sought to prevent candidates for judicial office from
announcing their views on disputed issues. 92 The Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(i) states that "a candidate for judicial office, including an incumbent judge, [shall not]
announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues." 93 Minnesota, like Alabama and
Michigan, conducts elections for judicial office; however the elections in Minnesota are
nonpartisan. 94 Minnesota's stated justifications for the announce clause, with which the Court of
95
Appeals agreed, were preserving both actual impartiality and the appearance of impartiality.
87

1d. at 42-43.

88 Id.
at 43

(emphasis added).

89

Butler, 802 So.2d at 218.
90
Id.at 214-15 (emphasis added).
91 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
92
93
94

Id at 768.
Id.
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,

9'White, 536 U.S. at 775.

supra note 40.

Richmond JournalofLaw and the PublicInterest

Summer 2004

While campaigning for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal
criticized several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions. 96 This resulted in a complaint being filed
against Wersal with the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility. 97 Although
the complaint against Wersal was dismissed, he filed suit attacking the constitutionality of the
announce clause. 98 The Republican Party of Minnesota joined in the suit, and ultimately became
the named party. 99

In its brief to the United States Supreme Court, the Republican Party attacked the logic of
the announce clause on several grounds. It claimed that the announce clause was "irrational"
because it applied only during election campaigns l ° and did not take into account the fact that
judges' opinions are issued as a matter of course in judicial opinions, and are a critical part of the
judicial function.' 0 ' Furthermore, the Republican Party argued, judges need not recuse
themselves when cases are remanded to them because of the presumption of impartiality. 10 2 The
petitioner's brief attacks the10 announce
clause as not being narrowly tailored to meet the stated
3
impartiality.
judicial
of
goal
While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the State had met its burden and
demonstrated a compelling interest in judicial impartiality, the United States Supreme Court
reversed its decision. In the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia sided with the Republican Party of
Minnesota in that the canon is not narrowly tailored to satisfy the stated government interest of
impartiality. 10 4 The opinion distinguishes "impartiality" from "interest." Justice Scalia wrote:
A judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has
never been thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with good
reason .... 105 "It would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if they had not
at
10 6
careers."
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constitutional
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The opinion also attacks the canon as under inclusive because a person is limited in addressing
issues only while a candidate, and not at any other time, including while on the bench. 10 7 In
perhaps the most interesting passage of the opinion, at least with respect to the efficacy of
judicial elections, Justice Scalia criticized Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion that it is a
violation of due process for a judge to sit in a case in which his ruling would impact his election
chances: "So if [Justice Ginsburg is10correct],
then-quite simply-the practice of electing judges
8
is itself a violation of due process."'
96
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Ultimately, the Court held that Minnesota's announce clause unconstitutional because it
was not narrowly tailored and because it abridged core political speech. 10 9 While Justice Scalia's
opinion largely refrains from commenting on the wisdom of judicial elections, Justice O'Connor
devotes her entire concurring opinion to the matter. Her opinion cites numerous scholarly works
that draw particular attention to the effects of money on judicial campaigns.1 10 Justice O'Connor
writes: "I am concerned that, even aside from what judicial candidates may say while
campaigning, the very practice of electing judges undermines this interest [in an impartial
judiciary].""' Furthermore, Justice O'Connor fears that judges will not only feel political
pressure to decide cases, but that funding a campaign will invite partiality. She concludes: "If
the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself
by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges."1 12 Justice Scalia's majority opinion and
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion again bring to the forefront the inherent tension between
popular elections of judges and the need for judicial independence. While it is too soon to know
White's full impact, it is not beyond reason that Justice O'Connor's opinion, in particular, will
serve as a catalyst for those who would move away from contested judicial elections.
D. The Impact of Recent Cases
State ethics rules regarding spending and speech are closely related First Amendment
issues, both of which have a tremendous impact on how judicial elections are being conducted.
Suster v. Marshall held that Ohio's canon of judicial conduct limiting the amount of campaign
expenditures was unconstitutional, based largely on the logic enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Buckley v. Valeo. 113 While few states had such spending limits, the clear message to other
states contemplating such restrictions was that such limits would have difficulty passing
constitutional muster. Similarly, state canons restricting the type of campaign
speech that could
11 4
and Michigan. 115
Alabama
both
in
unconstitutional
held
were
elections
judicial
in
be used
Chmura and Butler made clear that limits on political speech are at the heart of the First
Amendment, and as a consequence will be strictly scrutinized, even when a legitimate purpose
such as a "fair and impartial judiciary" is at stake. 1 16 Taken together, these cases stand for the
proposition that judicial candidates are subject only to the most narrow of restrictions on how
they may conduct their campaigns.
The impact of these cases is substantial in the realm of judicial elections. First, these
decisions bring judicial candidates under essentially the same rules as any other political officeseeker. While this may seem self-evident, when held against the original intent of judicial
elections, there is a stark dichotomy. For example, one justification that has historically been
offered to support judicial elections is that an elected judiciary is more responsive to the needs of
the "common man" and disenfranchised than the appointed judges who were perceived to be part

109 Id. at 788.

110 See id. at 788-92.

"' Id. at 788.
112 Id. at 792.
113 Suster, 951 F.Supp. at 697-98, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
114 See Butler, 802 So.2d at 213.
115 See Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 45.
116 Butler, 802 So.2d at 215; Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 39.
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of the landed gentry and out of touch with ordinary voters. 117 A common criticism of modem
politicians, and political leaders in general, is that they are beholden to special interests, and as a
consequence are out of touch with average voters. By bringing judicial elections into the same
realm as legislative and executive elections (that is, no limits on spending and very limited
restrictions on campaign speech) these decisions have essentially obviated a core principle of an
elected judiciary and further highlighted the two conflicting ideals of judicial independence and
representative democracy.
In addition to bringing judicial campaigns into the same sphere as other brands of
politics, these decisions also blur the lines between the judicial and legislative branches. As
mentioned in Part II, infra, another rationale for judicial elections was that by going through the
elective process themselves, judges would be more aware of the responsibility of judicial review,
and its impact on the political process. In theory, the legislature and judiciary would then be less
likely to act to counter the other branch because an appropriate remedy was available to the
voters at the ballot box."18 While this is still true, the nature of the elective process changes the
dynamic between the branches considerably. In light of the decisions already outlined, those
campaigning for judicial offices are not limited to discussing what has already occurred, but they
are free to discuss matters that may arise. Thus, a judicial candidate is free to declare that he or
she would overturn an act of the legislature as part of their constitutionally protected political
speech. As Justice Scalia points out in White, a judge who has not contemplated issues is neither
desirable nor realistic, 119 however, when the political reality is compared side-by-side with the
historical justification, there is conflict. The historical model viewed judicial elections as
remedial, whereas the modern reality is that judicial elections are at least as prospective as they
are remedial. The net effect of the constitutional protections for political speech in judicial
campaigns is that the very character of the process has transformed into something that bears a
close resemblance to every other political campaign, as the two case studies that follow point
out.
V. The "Modern Election" Case Studies
Before any conclusions as to the efficacy of judicial elections can be drawn, it is
important to understand the context in which these elections occur today. After all, the "modem
election" encompasses the political reality in which judicial elections take place and provide the
benchmark by which historical justifications for judicial elections may be examined. For years,
Texas served as the most notorious example of excess in judicial elections. 120 The 2000 election
year was a departure from this pattern, as the examples below indicate. These examples are
illustrative of some of the more extreme problems that currently exist and what could be on the
horizon for many other states in light of the recent state and federal decisions on campaign
spending and speech.

1"See PINELLO, supranote 25, at 3;
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120 See generally Schotland, supranote
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In the 2000 judicial elections for state supreme court seats, candidates raised over $45
million, and non-candidate spending added another $16 million. 12 1 For example, thirteen
candidates for the five open Supreme Court seats in Alabama spent an average of $1.1 million
each. 122 The spending levels in Alabama reflected several "hot-button" issues facing the
Alabama judiciary including mandatory arbitration and punitive damage awards, both of which
were the topic of radio and TV advertisements. 123 This is also the election cycle that gave rise to
the Butler litigation described in Part IV, infra. The ABA Journal's recent article entitled
"Boosting the Bench" by Terry Carter pointed out that one of the biggest contributors to these
campaigns is the United States Chamber of Commerce. 124 In the 2000 election, the Chamber of
Commerce spent $1.9 million in TV ads, outspending the trial lawyers and unions combined by
$1 million. 125 The Chamber's ads (as well as those of other organizations) are now almost
exclusively issue ads, thus circumventing most donor disclosure laws. 126 In addition to their ad
spending, the Chamber of Commerce spent over $10 million nationwide on various judicial
races. 127 In general, the Chamber of Commerce's goal in pumping so much money into judicial
elections is to make the bench more pro-business while simultaneously vilifying "trial lawyers
and ambulance chasers."' 128 The problems and challenges posed by this influx of money and
issue advertising could be encapsulated by the campaigns in Michigan and Ohio in 2000.
Michigan and Ohio became the primary battlegrounds for issue ads in the 2000
campaign. Democratic party ads in Michigan claimed that the incumbent court "ruled against
families and for corporations 82% of the time."' 129 Republican ads accused an appellate judge
running for the supreme court of being soft on pedophiles. 130 The Chamber of Commerce
participation yielded the most infamous issue ad aired in Ohio:
[T]he ad features a statue of Lady Justice who peeks underneath her blindfold as
piles of special interest money tip her scales [and] states [that] Justice Resnick
ruled nearly 70 percent of the time in favor of trial lawyers who have given her
more than $750,000
since 1994.. .Concluded the announcer: "Alice Resnick. Is
' 13 1

justice for sale?"

Not only were the ad campaigns pointed, the campaigns began 3earlier
and the vast majority of
2
individual campaign contributors were lawyers or their spouses. 1
The 2000 Supreme Court campaign in Idaho is also indicative of the type of issues now
being raised in judicial elections. The central issue in the campaign was an environmental
122
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decision in favor of the federal government, which galvanized conservatives against the "liberal"
justice who ruled in the case. 133 A Republican challenged a then-sitting Idaho Supreme Court
Justice Cathy Silak not only on the environmental issue and her participation in the decision, but
supporters of the culturally conservative Republican candidate ran ads insinuating that reelecting the "activist" justice could lead to the legalization of same-sex marriages and partial
birth abortions, and result in more gun control. 1 34 A sitting justice was defeated
for the first time
135
in Idaho since 1944 despite vehemently denying the challenger's accusations.
These few examples highlight that judicial elections are increasingly being conducted in
the same manner as other elections with fundraising and issue ads making a substantial impact.
While there is some restraint on what judicial candidates may themselves say in the course of an
election as the result of state ethics rules, 136 there is no such restraint on those airing issue ads.
Merit-selection plans and retention elections may be considered viable alternatives to the
kind of political issues raised by the 2000 election cycle, but even the judicially trail-blazing
state of Missouri has discovered that politics is playing an ever-larger role in retention elections.
Since the "Missouri Plan" was implemented in 1940, judges have often been retained by margins
approaching 90%.137 By 1990, the trend in Missouri indicated that many judges would not be
retained in the 1992 election, as margins fell to below 60%. 138 This erosion in retention
percentages, coupled with special-interest attacks such as the Voting Rights Act challenge to the
Missouri Plan (see Part IV(A), infra), prompted Plan supporters and opponents to begin a public
relations campaign exhorting the virtues and vices of the Plan. 139 Many proponents of the
Missouri Plan worried that voter anger would mean the most experienced members of the bench
would be removed, and qualified attorneys would be discouraged from serving. 14 The average
retention percentage in 1992 and 1994 was approximately 62%, and the percentage in 1996 (after
the flurry of advertising and "town meetings") increased to just over 66%. 141
While retention elections may be less contentious than popular elections, exit polls in
Missouri indicate that voters are aware of and influenced by even low-key advertising. In a 1992
Kansas City retention election, a radio ad indicating one local judge had a 28% approval rating
142
from lawyers, while another judge boasted a 93% approval rating swayed one third of voters.
Ultimately, the judge with higher approval rating was retained by a large margin, and the judge
with the lower rating was denied retention by a slim margin. 143 While these results may not
indicate the death of the Missouri Plan, they do point out that even non-partisan retention
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elections are growing more susceptible to the sort of overt issue campaigning prevalent in the
2000 judicial elections in states like Ohio and Michigan.
VI. Conclusions
At the heart of this difficult issue is the inherent tension between a "fair and impartial
judiciary" and the democratic process. Add to this mix the very essence of First Amendment
protection of political speech, and voters are left to wonder which of these cornerstones of
American life they find most valuable. Even without the recent body of law culminating in
White, judicial elections have been under attack for some time. As noted earlier, the American
Bar Association and other organizations have been advocating merit systems since the early part
of the twentieth century, and many states now have some sort of merit selection coupled with
retention elections. 144 In spite of the criticism, most states employ judicial elections on some
level.
It is critical to bear in mind some of the original purposes judicial elections served. Often
cited as the best reason to have contested elections of this sort is that an elected judiciary is more
responsive and accountable to the people. Other important reasons for conducting judicial
elections include preventing corruption and cronyism. While no system of selecting judges is
immune from problems, contested elections are particularly susceptible in recent years to many
of the ills they were originally intended to ameliorate, as the Michigan and Ohio examples
illustrate.
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of modern judicial elections is the impact of large
campaign contributions on judicial races. One of the primary justifications for judicial elections
is the notion that an elected judiciary is more responsive to the people and more reflective of the
populace, not the elite. 145 What the modern trend indicates is just the opposite. In addition to the
active role the United States Chamber of Commerce took in the 2000 election, 14 6 attorneys or
their spouses may be making the vast majority of individual campaign contributions (if the trend
in Michigan's two races is an accurate indicator). 147 While lawyers are free to make political
contributions just as anyone else, the appearance of lawyers contributing to the campaigns of
judges before whom they appear is certainly unsettling, if not unethical. 148 The combination of
interest groups and lawyer contributions raises the question: have the voters traded the influence
of one group of elites for another? Increasingly, the answer appears to be 'yes.' While it is no
longer the landed gentry who are selecting the judges, special interests are contributing to
campaigns in unprecedented levels, and undoubtedly influencing the outcome of elections, as
occurred in Idaho in 2000. In the wake of White, Suster, Chmura, and Hunter, all of which make
judicial campaigns more closely resemble their political brothers, money is becoming the key to
victory in increasingly contentious campaigns.
See generally Parts I and III, infra.
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Another troubling aspect of modem judicial campaigns is that rather than being an
effective restraint on government power, the elected judiciary is campaigning on its own agenda.
As the holding in White indicates, there is now nothing to stop a judicial candidate from
declaring a position on any issue, even those that may come before the court. 14 9 Again, drawing
on historical justifications for judicial elections, proponents believed that the legislature would
not feel compelled to act on court rulings because the court members themselves were subject to
the will of the people. While this might have been a reasonable assumption at one time, judges
are now campaigning on many of the same issues as legislators. The 2000 campaign in Idaho
highlights this issue. An Idaho Supreme Court Justice was labeled "liberal" and "activist" based
largely on one unpopular decision, and her opponent insinuated she would be "liberal" with
respect to social issues. 150 A potentially "activist" judge was deemed unacceptable for the Idaho
Supreme Court; however, modem judicial campaigns encourage would-be judges of all political
persuasions to rail against the doctrine of stare decisis. There appears to be very little political
worth in campaigning on a platform of "following the law" (as supporters of the Idaho judge
found out). Rather, candidates center their campaigns on how tough they will be on criminals (or
how soft their opponents have been), and how they would not have decided a case the same way
as the sitting court did. In effect, all judges are forced to be "activists" by the campaigning
process and are essentially competing with legislators to see who can address the needs of voters
first. This flies in the face of the notion that the judiciary is a check on legislative power; rather
the judiciary becomes a quasi-legislature with its own campaign agenda, and is placed in51the
position of including voter sentiment in both their campaigns and judicial decision-making. 1
The recent court decisions beg the question, what can be done to perpetuate the positive
attributes of judicial elections while still ensuring judicial independence? Until recently, states
were in a position to regulate judicial candidates using codes of judicial conduct, largely
modeled after the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 152 In particular,
the Code prohibits all judges and candidates from making statements that "appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court. 1 53 While this language is somewhat different than the "announce clause" at issue in
White, the cases outlined herein indicate that even such mild language as appears in the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct may be unconstitutional. While it would seem that White, Chmura and
Suster leave very little room for regulation of judicial elections, there is likely a narrow gap
where some regulation of conduct would be constitutional. For example, the Chmura court held
that an appropriately tailored, compelling state interest in limiting judicial campaign speech
included preventing fraud and libel, which adversely impact the integrity of the election process
and the judiciary. 154 As a result, the court amended the judicial canon at issue to prevent only
that speech which is "knowingly, or with reckless disregard," false. 155 Although judges and
lawyers are subject to discipline for their behavior, special interest groups are not, so even the
149
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most narrowly tailored of ethics rules will not solve all of the problems associated with recent
judicial elections. Likewise, the court in Suster followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Buckley v. Valeo, thus allowing for caps on campaign contributions. 156 Several states have
contemplated more stringent disclosure laws, and even public funding of judicial campaigns that
would be able to exist within the current constitutional framework of Buckley. 157 However,
relying on Buckley and its progeny is tenuous at best. As Justices Thomas and Scalia stated in
their dissent in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC 158 they would not hesitate to overturn
Buckley: "Buckley's ratification of the government's attempt to wrest this fundamental right [of
campaign contributions] from citizens was error." 159 Given that the Court is likely to review
campaign finance reform in this term of the Court, all laws relating to campaign finance could be
facing an overhaul in the near future.
In spite of the increasingly expensive and contentious nature of judicial elections, most
states that have recognized problems have not changed their judicial selection method. For
example, voters in the 2000 Florida election rejected a ballot initiative that would have
introduced merit selection. 160 While most states continue to have judicial elections, some
commentators feel that the Supreme Court's decision in White might be central to turning the
public away from partisan elections: "Things are only going to get uglier and nastier, and the
only good news is that merit selection might become a reality if these campaigns become too
squalid for words."' 161 Merit selection has its own pitfalls, however, as Missouri discovered in
the 1990s. 162 In addition, retention elections
historically have suffered from low voter turnout
63
1
decision-making.
voter
and uninformed
Perhaps lost in all of the commentary is the idea expressed in both Butler and Chmura
that judicial elections offer voters a periodic debate on the direction of the judiciary, and that
concept alone justifies judicial elections. Implied in that logic is that it is better to know where a
judicial candidate stands on issues of importance to voters and allow them to participate in
selection, than to allow a small group (whether legislators, a commission, or executive) to
determine who will serve on the bench based upon a set of criteria generally unknown to the
populace. This notion obviously reflects the desire to have a judiciary that is accountable to the
people.
Ultimately, the continued viability of judicial elections hinges on the inherent tension
between elective politics and judicial independence. While historical justifications for an elected
judiciary may still ring true with average voters who feel that they know their local judges, on a
larger scale, judicial independence is threatened when judges are subject to the same political
system and pressures as other politicians. Voters must decide which they value more: political
process or judicial independence. All agree that protecting the judiciary from actual or apparent
impropriety is essential, yet the future of judicial elections seems fraught with conflicts of
156 See Suster, 951
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interest, partisan politics and policy discussions previously absent. Judicial independence and
direct democracy have managed to coexist for the last 150 years, yet in the wake of White and
other recent cases, that coexistence is increasingly fragile.

